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Government Procurement in the United States–
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Hong-Sik (Justin) Chung* 
 
Abstract: The Free Trade Agreement entered into between the United States and the 
Republic of Korea (KORUS FTA) contains government procurement provisions in 
Chapter 17.  Although each respective procurement market has already been opened 
to the other party under the WTO Government Procurement Agreement, this access 
has been very limited, not only because the market has traditionally been exclusive 
against foreign suppliers, but also because there were several preferential regulations 
and policies for domestic firms in the course of awarding procurement contracts.  
This Article analyzes how Chapter 17 of the KORUS FTA expands upon the WTO 
Government Procurement Agreement with the hope of bringing Korean firms greater 
access to the U.S. procurement market and vice versa.  It also examines relevant U.S. 
and Korean statutes and regulations to see how foreign procurement is made and 
whether there are any barriers to the other side’s firms.  With this analysis, the 
Article explores better and more efficient ways in which Korean and U.S. firms could 
further increase government contracts with the other side’s government.  The Article 
asserts that the KORFUS FTA will bring, relatively, more benefits to Korean firms.  
Further, because most of the commodities made in the United States are not quite 
competitive in terms of price as compared with those of Korea in the procurement 
market, any interested U.S. firms may want to focus on service sectors that are 
competitive and not dealt with by Korean firms.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The United States and the Republic of Korea reached an historic free 
trade agreement, the United States–Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS 
FTA), on April 1, 2007.1  This comprehensive trade agreement seeks to 
eliminate tariffs and other barriers to trade in goods and services, promote 
economic growth, and strengthen economic ties between the United States 
and Korea.  In early 2012, both countries eventually ratified the KORUS 
FTA. 
In Chapter 17, the agreement contains government procurement 
provisions in which both countries agree to open their procurement markets 
to the other party, with some limitations.2  The KORUS FTA is based on 
the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (WTO GPA) 3  and 
applies many WTO GPA articles and provisions to Chapter 17.  Both the 
United States and Korea are members of the WTO GPA.  Thus, each 
respective procurement market has already been opened to the other party 
under the mechanism of the WTO GPA.  However, accessibility to the 
other party’s procurement market has been very limited, not only because 
the market has traditionally been exclusive against foreign suppliers, but 
also because there are several preferential regulations and policies for 
domestic firms in the course of awarding procurement contracts. 
By recognizing such limitations and barriers in the procurement 
market, Chapter 17 of the KORUS FTA attempts to expand its criteria and 
require that each country open more government contracts to the other 
party, especially when compared with the WTO GPA.  Chapter 17 
 
1 Free Trade Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea, U.S.-S. 
Kor., June 30, 2007, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE [hereinafter KORUS FTA], available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta/final-text.  In addition to the final 
agreement, on February 10, 2011, the United States and Korea exchanged the legal texts—signed by U.S. 
Trade Representative Ron Kirk and Korean Trade Minister Kim Jong-Hoon—reflecting the agreement 
they concluded on December 3, 2010.  This set the stage for congressional considerations of the 
KORUS FTA.  The signed texts consist of three documents: (1) an exchange of letters between 
Ambassador Kirk and Minister Kim containing new commitments for the automotive sector; (2) agreed 
minutes on regulations pertaining to automotive fuel economy and greenhouse gas emissions; and (3) 
agreed minutes on intracompany transferee (L-1) visas.  See Legal Texts Reflecting December 3, 2010 
Agreement, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-
trade-agreements/korus-fta/legal-texts-reflecting-december-3-2010-agreement (last visited May 9, 
2014). 
2 See KORUS FTA, supra note 1, ch. 17. 
3 Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 4(b), 1915 U.N.T.S. 103 [hereinafter WTO GPA]. 
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significantly lowers the threshold amount for coverage, which is roughly 
half of the threshold amount under the WTO GPA.4  Further, Chapter 17 
clearly prohibits the requirement of prior work experiences in the territory 
of the party of the procuring entity.5  In addition, Chapter 17 establishes a 
working group on government procurement to address any related issues 
and foster the procurement process.6 
In theory, the proper operation of Chapter 17 should provide Korean 
firms with great opportunities to access to the large U.S. procurement 
market, and vice versa.  But does it really do so?  If not, what regulatory 
restrictions and barriers still exist in the U.S. and Korean procurement 
systems, respectively?  Further, what strategies should the private firms of 
both countries consider, despite the restrictions and barriers, to secure more 
procurement contracts from the other government?  This Article aims to 
answer these questions from both a Korean and U.S. perspective. 
This Article first gives an overview of the WTO GPA and its 
relationship to the KORUS FTA.  Subsequently, it analyzes how the 
KORUS FTA expands upon the WTO GPA with the hope of bringing 
Korean firms greater access to the U.S. procurement market and vice versa.  
Thus, this Article analyzes Chapter 17 provisions that are set forth in the 
Annexes, as well as in the main text of the KORUS FTA.  Third, it shows 
the size of the respective procurement market of both countries and 
identifies which portions of those markets will be open to the private firms 
of the other party.  Fourth, it examines relevant U.S. statutes and 
regulations to determine whether the KORUS FTA has precluded 
application of certain U.S. buy-national restrictions and other barriers to 
Korean firms.  It also examines relevant Korean statutes and regulations to 
see how foreign procurement operates and determine whether there are any 
barriers to U.S firms.  Finally, this Article explores better and more 
efficient ways for Korean and U.S. firms to further increase their 
procurement contracts with the other government. 
Overall, this Article asserts that because Korean firms may have 
greater opportunities to enter into the U.S. procurement market, and show 
stronger interests and effort than U.S. firms, the KORUS FTA will bring, 
relatively, more benefits to Korean firms.  Meanwhile, it appears that few 
U.S. firms are interested in the Korean procurement market.  Because most 
of the commodities made in the United States are not quite competitive in 
terms of price as compared to Korean goods in the procurement market, 
any interested U.S. firms may want to focus on service sectors that are 
competitive and not dealt with by Korean firms.  However, due to existence 
of language and cultural barriers in the Korean procurement market, this 
 
4 See KORUS FTA, supra note 1, Party’s Schedule to Annex 17-A; see also Table 1 infra. 
5 See KORUS FTA, supra note 1, art. 17.5(2). 
6 See KORUS FTA, supra note 1, art. 17.10. 
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Article recommends that interested U.S. firms consider strategic alliances 
with appropriate Korean firms. 
 
II.  OVERVIEW OF THE WTO GPA 
 
The WTO GPA was signed on April 15, 1994, and became effective 
on January 1, 1996.  It is “one of four ‘plurilateral’ trade agreements7 that 
applies only among the GPA members that agree to adhere to particular 
GPA commitments on a reciprocal basis.” 8   Within the agreement, 
“members selectively offer concessions to certain WTO GPA members 
only, depending on reciprocal commitments.”9  The WTO GPA currently 
has 40 members, including but not limited to 28 members of the European 
Union (EU), Japan, South Korea, and the United States.10 
The WTO GPA contains four Appendices.11  It does not automatically 
apply to all government procurement completed by the signatory parties.  
Rather, agreement coverage is determined with regard to each party in the 
Appendix I Annexes. 12   Each party’s Appendix I has five Annexes, 
defining the coverage of that party’s obligations under the agreement.13  
Each party’s Appendix I Annexes also specify the threshold value above 
which individual procurements are covered by the agreement.14  The WTO 
GPA applies to the procurement of covered entities, the value of which 
exceeds the threshold amount, expressed in terms of Special Drawing 
 
7 The four original plurilateral agreements, as of January 1, 1995, were: (1) Agreement on Trade in 
Civil Aircraft; (2) Agreement on Government Procurement; (3) International Dairy Agreement; and (4) 
International Bovine Meat Agreement.  See WTO GPA, supra note 3.  However, both the International 
Dairy Agreement and the International Bovine Meat Agreement were terminated at the end of 1997, 
and thus, only the first two agreements remain.  See Termination of the International Dairy Agreement, 
Sept. 30, 1997, IDA/8 (1997), and Termination of the International Bovine Meat Agreement, Sept. 30, 
1997, IMA/8 (1997). 
8 Christopher F. Corr & Kristina Zissis, Convergence & Opportunity: The WTO Government 
Procurement Agreement and U.S. Procurement Reform, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 303, 334 
(1998–99). 
9 Id.; see also Jean Heilman Grier, Japan’s Implementation of the WTO Agreement on Government 
Procurement, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 605, 617–21 (1996). 
10 For a list of WTO GPA Member States, see Parties and Observers to the GPA, WORLD TRADE 
ORG. [WTO], http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/memobs_e.htm (last visited May 8, 2014). 
11 Appendices, Annexes, and Notes to the WTO GPA “constitute an integral part thereof.”  See 
WTO GPA, supra note 3, art. XXIV:12. 
12 SUE ARROWSMITH, GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT IN THE WTO 115 (Kluwer Law Int’l, 2003). 
13 The five Annexes are: (1) Annex 1 containing central government entities; (2) Annex 2 
containing sub-central government entities; (3) Annex 3 containing all other entities that procure in 
accordance with the provisions of the Agreement; (4) Annex 4 specifying services, whether listed 
positively or negatively, covered by the Agreement; and (5) Annex 5 specifying covered construction 
services.  See Appendices and Annexes to the GPA, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_ 
e/appendices_e.htm#coverage (last visited May 8, 2014). 
14 For all signatory parties’ current Appendices and Annexes, see id. 
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Rights (SDRs).15  These SDR threshold amounts for the United States and 
Korea are summarized in Table 1.  Procurement contracts not exceeding 
the threshold amounts are not subject to the WTO GPA.16 
 
TABLE 1.  Threshold Amounts for the United States and Korea Under the 
WTO GPA17 
 





− 130,000 SDRs18 ($193,700) for 
goods and services 
− 5 million SDRs ($745,000) for 
construction services 
− 130,000 SDRs ($193,700) for 
goods and services 






− 355,000 SDRs ($528,950) for 
goods and services 
− 5 million SDRs ($745,000) for 
construction services, except 
Korean construction services and 
suppliers of such services for 
which the United States applies a 
threshold of 15 million SDRs 
($22,350,000) 
− 200,000 SDRs ($298,000) for 
goods and services 
− 15 million SDRs 





− 400,000 SDRs ($596,000) for 
goods and services, except 
federally-owned utilities for 
which the United States applies a 
threshold of $250,000  
− 450,000 SDRs ($670,500) for 
goods and services 
− 15 million SDRs 
($22,350,000) for construction 
services 
 
15 Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) are the International Monetary Fund’s international reserve 
asset, based on a basket of currencies from several countries.  Notably, “[t]hese values are then 
converted into national currencies in accordance with the Committee on Government Procurement 
Decision on Modalities for Notifying Threshold Figures in National Currencies.  Conversion rates are 
based on those published by the International Monetary Fund in International Financial Statistics . . . 
[N]ew conversion rates are produced every 2 years to apply for the following 2 years.”  See 
ARROWSMITH, supra note 12, at 134. 
16 The WTO GPA applies to “any contract for which the contract value is estimated to equal or 
exceed the threshold at the time when the notice of intended procurement is published,” not the value of 
payments actually made.  Id. at 135.  Unfortunately, “[a] common problem with any procurement 
system using financial thresholds is for entities to spread their purchases over a number of contracts so 
that each contract falls below the thresholds . . . [The WTO] GPA contains explicit provisions designed 
to prevent this happening.”  Id. at 136.  The first is Article II.3 of the WTO GPA, which provides that 
“a procurement requirement shall not be divided with the intention of avoiding the application of the 
Agreement.”  Id. at 137.  The second provision is Article II.4 of the WTO GPA, which states that 
“whenever there is an ‘individual requirement’ for a procurement that results in more than one contract 
being awarded, or in contracts being awarded in separate parts, the basis of valuation shall be . . . the 
value of all the relevant contracts awarded over a period of 1 year, added together.”  Id. at 137. 
17 See Appendices and Annexes to the GPA, supra note 13. 
18 As of December 30, 2010, one SDR equals approximately $1.54 USD.  See Currency Amounts in 
New Special Drawing Rights (SDR) Basket, INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/ 
np/tre/sdr/sdrbasket.htm (last visited May 8, 2014).  
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− 5 million SDRs ($745,000) for 
construction services, except 
Korean construction services and 
suppliers of such services for 
which the United States applies a 
threshold of 15 million SDRs 
($22,350,000) 
 
Appendix II contains publications utilized by the parties regarding 
notices of intended procurements.19  Appendix III lists the publications that 
provide information on “permanent lists of qualified suppliers in the case of 
selective tendering procedures” under GPA Article IX, paragraph 9.20  
Finally, Appendix IV includes, for each party, the sources of “laws, 
regulations, judicial decisions, administrative rulings of general application 
and any procedure regarding government procurement covered” under 
GPA Article XIX, paragraph 1.21 
 
III.  GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT OF THE KORUS FTA 
 
A.  Scope and Coverage 
 
Chapter 17 of the KORUS FTA reaffirms the WTO GPA as a baseline 
for government procurement, but expands the criteria to include more 
contracts.22  The threshold level set forth in Chapter 17 is “100,000 U.S. 
dollars with respect to the United States and 100 million Korean won with 
respect to Korea.”23  This threshold level is nearly half the amount required 
under the WTO GPA.  “Build-operate-transfer contracts and public works 
concession contracts” are also included in the coverage.24 
 
19 See Appendices and Annexes to the GPA, supra note 13, app. II.  Korea publishes its lists using 
the Korean ON-line E-Procurement System and Daily Press (if necessary) for government procurement.  
The United States uses the Federal Business Opportunities website, and for state entities, it refers to 
publications utilized by state governments, such as the New York Contract Reporter. 
20 Korea lists the Korean ON-line E-Procurement System website.  For federal business 
opportunities, the United States refers to the Federal Business Opportunities website and entities in 
Annexes 2 and 3 of Appendix I, as an alternative to publication in the Commerce Business Daily 
(CBD), which “may provide such information directly to interested suppliers through inquiries to 
contact points listed in notices regarding invitations to participate.”  See id. app. III.   
21 See id. app. IV.  Korea identifies Kwanbo (the Korean Government’s Official Gazette) and the 
Korean ON-line E-Procurement System.  The United States identifies the Federal Acquisition 
Regulations (FAR) as part of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Title 48, Chapter 1, for the 
entities listed in Annex 1 of Appendix I.  The entities listed in Annexes 2 and 3 of Appendix I are 
available through relevant state or local publications. 
22 See KORUS FTA, supra note 1, art. 17:1(1). 
23 See KORUS FTA, supra note 1, Annex 17-A, Section A (Central Level Government Entities). 
24 Build-operate-transfer contracts and public works concession contracts include “any contractual 
arrangement, the primary purpose of which is to provide for the construction or rehabilitation of 
physical infrastructure, plant, buildings, facilities, or other government-owned works and under which, 
as consideration for a supplier’s execution of a contractual arrangement, a procuring entity grants to the 
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The WTO GPA applies to contracts tendered by 79 U.S. Federal 
government agencies and by 42 Korean central government entities listed 
in the Annexes.25  The KORUS FTA includes even more government 
agencies and entities, in addition to those listed under the WTO GPA.  
Under the KORUS FTA, Korea will provide U.S. firms with non-
discriminatory access to “nine (9) more Korean central government 
entities” that are not covered under the WTO GPA.26  The United States 
also adds one more entity that is not covered by the WTO GPA—the Social 
Security Administration.27 
Procurement by the sub-central governments (or state governments in 
the United States) and government-owned enterprises are excluded from 
coverage under the KORUS FTA.28  Korea originally requested that the 
United States include the remaining 13 states that are not part of the WTO 
GPA coverage into the list of coverage.29  However, the United States 
refused to do so, pointing to state governments that strongly opposed their 
inclusion in the list of covered entities, and the federal government’s 
weakened power to control state governments.30  In response to the United 
States’ position, Korea also excluded procurement of its sub-central 
government entities and government-owned enterprises from coverage.  
Chapter 17 of the KORUS FTA is, thus, only applicable to central (federal) 
level government procurement by both parties.31  In light of its reduced 
threshold amount, however, the KORUS FTA’s scope of coverage is 
substantially larger than that of the WTO GPA. 
 
B.  Application of the WTO GPA Provisions and Recognition of 
WTO GPA Revision 
 
Chapter 17 of the KORUS FTA adopts and incorporates many WTO 
GPA provisions concerning unlisted entities, contract valuation, national 
treatment and non-discrimination, rules of origin, technical specifications, 
 
supplier, for a specified period of time, temporary ownership or a right to control and operate, and 
demand payment for the use of, such works for the duration of the contract.”  KORUS FTA, supra note 
1, art.17:11 (Definitions). 
25 For the list of U.S. government agencies, see Appendices and Annexes to the GPA, supra note 13, 
Annex 1 under U.S. Appendix I, and for the list of Korean central government entities, see id. Annex 1 
under Korea Appendix I of WTO GPA. 
26 See KORUS FTA, supra note 1, Annex 17-A, Section A (Central Level Government Entities). 
27 See id. 
28 See id. Annex 17-A. 
29 최낙균 & 이용식외, 한•미 FTA 협상의 분야별 평가와 정책과제 [A SECTORAL 
ASSESSMENT OF THE KOREA–U.S. FTA AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE KOREAN ECONOMY] 301–
02 (대외경제정책연구원 [Korea Institute for Int’l Econ. Pol’y], 2007) (S. Kor.). 
30 Id. 
31 It should be noted that Korean firms are still accessible to 37 state government procurement 
markets under the WTO GPA system in accordance with the threshold amounts for the United States, as 
shown in Table 1, if the KORUS FTA becomes effective. 
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and many tendering procedures such as supplier qualification, participation, 
documentation, awards, limited tendering, offsets, and challenge 
procedures. 32   In December 2006, the Committee on Government 
Procurement in the WTO finalized a revision of the WTO GPA.33  Such 
revision was made in accordance with WTO GPA Article XXIV:7 
concerning a commitment to further negotiations for purposes of improving 
and updating the GPA, in light, inter alia, of the developments in 
information technology and procurement methods, extending the coverage 
of the agreement, and eliminating the remaining discriminatory measures.  
However, the revision is still “provisional in that it is subject to: (i) a legal 
check; and (ii) a mutually satisfactory outcome to the other aspect of the 
negotiations on a new Government Procurement Agreement, namely those 
on an expansion of coverage (i.e., the lists of government entities whose 
procurement is opened up).”34 
Chapter 17 of the KORUS FTA recognizes the provisionally approved 
text of the revised WTO GPA.35  Once the revised WTO GPA becomes 
effective, the United States and Korea “shall promptly incorporate by 
reference the appropriate provisions of the revised [WTO] GPA.”36 
 
C.  Non-Application to Any Set-Asides for Small and Medium-
Sized (Minority-Owned) Businesses 
 
Chapter 17 does not apply to any set-asides for small and medium-
sized businesses under the Schedule of Korea, or any set-asides on behalf 
of “small or minority-owned businesses” under the Schedule of the United 
States.37  In other words, the set-asides will not be open to the other party 
even if the relevant procurement exceeds the threshold of $100,000 or 100 
million Korean won, respectively.38  Because preferential treatment of 
small and minority-owned businesses is allowed as a domestic policy, both 
parties reached an agreement to exclude the relevant businesses from 
coverage.  However, this does not mean that it is impossible for private 
firms from both countries to participate in set-aside businesses.  There are 




32 See KORUS FTA, supra note 1, art. 17:3. 
33 WTO Secretariat, Revision of the Agreement on Government Procurement as of 8 December 
2006, GPA/W/297 (Dec. 8, 2006). 
34 WTO Secretariat, The Re-Negotiation of the Agreement on Government Procurement, GPA/112 
(Dec. 16, 2011). 
35 See KORUS FTA, supra note 1, art. 17:3(3). 
36 See KORUS FTA, supra note 1, art. 17:3(3). 
37 The United States Small Business Act requires the government to allocate parts of the 
government procurements to small-sized and minority-owned businesses.  15 U.S.C. § 631 (2008). 
38 See KORUS FTA, supra note 1, ch. 17, sched. E (General Notes). 
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D.  Prohibition of Any Prior Work Experiences in the Territory of 
the Party of the Procuring Entity 
 
WTO GPA Article VIII(b) includes a questionable provision, which 
states: “The financial, commercial and technical capacity of a supplier shall 
be judged on the basis both of that supplier’s global business activity as 
well as of its activity in the territory of the procuring entity, taking due 
account of the legal relationship between the supply organizations.”39  Thus, 
many procuring entities have required suppliers to furnish proof of any 
previous experience working in its territory. 40   Some criticize this 
requirement for discriminating against multinational suppliers, like Korean 
firms, who do not have any previous experience working in the United 
States despite their advanced skills and technology, while also failing to 
consider the suppliers’ global business activity.41 
The language of Chapter 17, however, clearly prohibits such a 
requirement.  A procuring entity “shall evaluate the supplier’s financial 
capacity and commercial and technical abilities on the basis of that 
supplier’s business activities outside the territory of the Party of the 
procuring entity as well as its business activities, if any, inside the territory 
of the Party of the procuring entity.”42  It is expected that such a prohibition 
may work very favorably for Korean firms because the requirement of the 
prior work experiences in the United States has prevented many 
competitive Korean firms from entering into the U.S. procurement market. 
 
E.  Establishment of a Working Group on Government Procurement 
 
Chapter 17 establishes a working group on government procurement 
to address any related issues, in particular those “related to information 
technology and exchange information relating to the government 
procurement opportunities in each Party.”43   The working group will 
consist of representatives from both parties.  The primary function of the 
working group is to foster the government procurement process by spotting 
and eliminating any types of administrative or legal barriers, if any, to the 
other party’s suppliers.  The successful operation of the working group is 
expected to open larger parts of the procurement market to both party and 





39 WTO GPA, supra note 3, art. VIII(b). 
40 See ARROWSMITH, supra note 12, at 225–26. 
41 Id. at 226. 
42 KORUS FTA, supra note 1, art. 17:5(2). 
43 KORUS FTA, supra note 1, art. 17:10. 
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F.  Exclusion of National Defense-Related Products and Services 
from Government Procurement 
 
Chapter 17 excludes national defense-related products from 
government procurement.  For the United States, certain categories of 
goods involving the Department of Defense are exempt from the chapter’s 
provisions, including particular ships and ship-related equipment; certain 
“specialty metals” such as certain steels, titanium, or zirconium and their 
alloys; different types of weapons and ordnance, aircraft and ships, and 
related components; and other categories involving electronic, fiber optic, 
and communication components.44  For Korea, only certain categories of 
goods involving the Ministry of National Defense, not related to national 
security, would be open to foreign-procurement tendering, as listed in the 
annex.45  Such exclusion of national defense-related products and services 
is consistent with the WTO GPA. 
However, as an exception, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has 
entered into a Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) with its counterparts in 
twenty-one foreign governments concerning reciprocal defense 
procurement and acquisition policy.46  Under the MoU, the United States 
shall not apply any discriminatory measures in the “Buy American Act”47 
to offers from the twenty-one countries’ sources on procurement for 
defense supplies at both the prime and subcontract levels.48  This ensures 
that the foreign defense suppliers are treated equally with domestic 
suppliers in DoD procurement, which comprises almost two-thirds of the 
United States’ entire federal government procurement. 
A question arises here as to whether Korea should enter into a 
reciprocal MoU with the United States.  Although this question is another 
big issue to be discussed in a separate article, it appears that Korea is in a 
position to contemplate the execution of the MoU on a long-term basis, 
especially since there is a significant gap between the United States and 
Korea in terms of defense-related technologies.49  Considering the price, 
 
44 KORUS FTA, supra note 1, Notes to United States Schedule at 4. 
45 See KORUS FTA, supra note 1, Notes to Korean Schedule at 2. 
46 41 U.S.C. § 10b-2 (2007).  The DoD has MoUs with Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.  DEPT. OF DEF., RECIPROCAL 
DEFENSE PROCUREMENT AND ACQUISITION POLICY MEMORANDA OF UNDERSTANDING, 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/cpic/ic/reciprocal_procurement_memoranda_of_understanding.html (last 
visited June 10,, 2014) (listing a copy of each respective MoU).  Korea is not a party to the MoU yet. 
47 Buy American Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 10a-10d (2011). 
48 DEF. FED. ACQUISITION REGULATION SUPPLEMENT (DFARS), CONTRACTING WITH QUALIFYING 
COUNTRY SOURCES 225.872 (2007). 
49 유규열, 한•미 FTA 정부조달 협정에 따른 한•미 상호 국방조달 MOU 추진 방향 [The 
Drive Direction of the ROK–USA Reciprocal Defense Procurement MOU Followed by the ROK–USA 
FTA Government Procurement Agreement], 33 무역학회지 [J. KOR. TRADE] 1, 13–4 (2008) (S. Kor.). 
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quality, and competitiveness of the defense-related products and services 
from the Korean government’s perspective, it would be premature to enter 
into the MoU at this time.50 
 
IV.  GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT MARKET OF BOTH 
COUNTRIES 
 
A.  U.S. Federal Government Procurement 
 
The U.S. government procurement market is the largest in the world.  
Nonetheless, it is difficult to obtain comprehensive statistical data for the 
entire procurement market because state and local governments do not 
periodically release their data.  This differs from federal government data, 
which the Federal Procurement Data System releases annually.51 
According to the Federal Procurement Data System—Next 
Generation, the number of reported actions and dollars has steadily 
increased since the fiscal year 2002.52  In the fiscal year 2007, the number 
of all reported actions and dollars was 3,973,578 and $460 billion, 
respectively.  This volume is roughly six times larger than that of Korea.53  





50 Id. at 14. 
51 The Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) is a system for collecting and compiling data on 
federal procurement.  The FPDS provides a comprehensive mechanism for assembling, organizing, and 
presenting contract placement data for the federal government.  RALPH C. NASH, JR. ET AL., THE 
GOVERNMENT CONTRACT REFERENCE BOOK, A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO THE LANGUAGE OF 
PROCUREMENT 259 (Wolters Kluwer 3d ed. 2007). 
52 Federal agencies report data directly to the Federal Procurement Data System–Next Generation 
(FPDS-NG), which collects, processes, and disseminates official statistical data on federal contracting.  
The data released by FPDS-NG provides (1) a basis for recurring and special reports to the President, 
Congress, the Government Accountability Office, federal executive agencies, and the general public, 
(2) a means of measuring and assessing the impact of federal contracting on the nation’s economy and 
the extent to which small, veteran-owned small business firms, service-disabled veteran-owned small 
business firms, HUBZone small business firms, small disadvantaged business firms, and women-owned 
small business firms share in federal contracts, and (3) information for other policy and management-
control purposes.  Id. 
53 See infra Table 6 (showing the amount of total government procurement in Korea). 
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TABLE 2.  Trending Analysis Report Since Fiscal Year 200354 
 
Year Number of Actions Dollar Value Increase from Previous Year 
2003 11,588,490 $326,353,562,910 18.58% 
2004 10,627,343 $357,737,511,060 9.62% 
2005 11,187,734 $389,621,189,770 8.91% 
2006 8,342,764 $415,466,073,469 6.63% 
2007 9,161,743 $465,622,671,417 12.07% 
2008 8,354,648 $537,155,101,194 15.36% 
 
 
Table 3 provides the total number of actions and total dollar amounts 
for fiscal year 2007 reserved for transactions in the following dollar ranges: 
(1) $0–$25,000, (2) $25,000–$100,000, (3) $100,000–$1,000,000, and (4) 
greater than or equal to $1,000,000.  The table also shows that most of the 
contract actions have been relatively small, or less than $25,000.  However, 
the dollar values of actions worth more than $100,000 occupy more than 
90% of the total dollar values.  On the other hand, the number of contract 
actions with dollar values greater than $100,000 is less than one-tenth of 
the total number of contract actions.  As the threshold amount was set forth 
at $100,000 under the KORUS FTA, it appears that Korean firms can, in 
theory, access more than 90% of the total dollar values, except for certain 
defense-related products and set-asides for small and minority firms. 
 

















FPDS Figures for 5 Years  
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TABLE 3.  Contract Actions by Dollar Value for Fiscal Year 200755 
 
Dollar Range Dollar Value Number of Actions Average Dollar Value per Action 
< $25,000 $11,054,768,303 3,280,263 $3,370 
$25,000 – 
$100,000 $18,491,543,257 394,087 $46,922 
$100,000  – 
$1,000,000 $68,202,986,756 244,209 $279,281 
≥ $1,000,000 $362,248,980,040 55,019 $6,584,070 
 
Table 4 shows the total dollars reserved for the Department of 
Defense 56  and other Civilian Agencies 57  for fiscal year 2007.  Since 
Chapter 17 excludes “defense-related products” 58  from KORUS FTA 
coverage, however, it is unclear what percentage of those products 
contributes to the DoD’s total dollar values.  Although it is difficult to 
measure an exact percentage of such defense-related products due to the 
lack of relevant statistics, it is likely a significant portion, presumably more 
than two-thirds of the DoD’s entire procurement. 
 
TABLE 4.  Contract Dollars by Executive Departments and Agencies 
 
 Dollar Value Percentage 
Federal Departments and Agencies 
Total Dollars $459,998,278,356 100% 
Civilian Agencies Total Dollars $129,240,301,112 28% 
Department of Defense Total 
Dollars $330,757,977,244 72% 
 
Another question centers on what portion of the dollar values listed for 
civilian agencies will be excluded from the KORUS FTA since Chapter 17 
is not applicable to government procurement contracts under $100,000.  
Again, no clear statistics can answer this question.  Based on the fact that 
 
55 FPDS-NG, FEDERAL PROCUREMENT REPORT FY 2007: TOTAL FEDERAL VIEWS (2008), available at 
https://www.fpdsng.com/downloads/FPR_Reports/Fiscal%20Year%202007/Total%20Federal%20View.pdf. 
56 The Department of Defense and its dollar values are divided as follows: Department of the Army 
($116,380,516,580), Department of the Navy ($85,129,455,186), Department of the Air Force 
($69,843,264,373), Defense Logistics Agency ($30,548,877,090), and Other DoD ($28,855,844,014).  See id. 
57 Civilian Agencies and their respective dollar values are divided as follows: Other Civilian 
($26,384,176,605), Energy ($23,153,543,593), Health and Human Services ($13,772,768,520), NASA 
($12,926,610,615), GSA ($12,423,150,338), Veteran Affairs ($12,323,172,027), Homeland Security 
($11,959,978,438), Agriculture ($4,350,607,196), Treasury ($4,091,868,522), Interior ($4,040,841,014), and 
Transportation ($3,813,584,244).  See id. 
58 For a list of defense-related products, see supra Part III.F. 
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contracts exceeding $100,000 occupy more than 90% of the total dollar 
value as seen in Table 3, more than 90% of the total dollar value from 
civilian agencies would likely be open to the Korean firms as well. 
Table 5 shows the top 10 procurements performed outside the U.S. 
territories for fiscal years 2005 through 2007.  It appears that most of those 
procurements were made for U.S. military forces based overseas.  The top 
three countries were Iraq, Kuwait, and Afghanistan where the United States 
was recently engaged in the war against terror.  Apart from these countries, 
procurements performed in Korea have significantly increased, and Korea 
was ranked 4th and 5th in fiscal years 2006 and 2007, respectively.  Most 
of the procurements made in Korea are regarded as purchases of products 
and services for the U.S. military forces based in Korea.  Following Korea 
are countries like Japan and Germany.  Meanwhile, the number of actions 
and total value of government procurements performed by Korean firms 
inside the U.S. territories is unknown.  The U.S. government does not 
officially provide data for such records. 
 
TABLE 5.  Top 10 Procurements Performed Outside the United States and 
U.S. Territories59 
 
2005 Dollars  2006 Dollars 
Iraq $14,614,101,715  Iraq $13,485,827,280 
Afghanistan $2,072,301,216  Kuwait $4,490,638,957 
Kuwait $2,040,984,529  Afghanistan $3,015,403,766 
Germany $2,600,838,537  Korea $2,710,438,601 
Canada $1,390,853,423  Japan $2,572179,693 
United Kingdom $1,228,966,826  Germany $2,570,811,597 
Korea $940,423,435  Canada $1,390,853,423 
Japan $909,180,804  United Kingdom $1,013,217,346 
Saudi Arabia $759,142,991  Italy $856,251,740 
Bahrain $499,767,427  UAE $649,133,818 
 
 
59 FPDS-NG, FEDERAL PROCUREMENT REPORT FY 2005: TOTAL FEDERAL VIEWS (2006); FPDS-NG, 
FEDERAL PROCUREMENT REPORT FY 2006: TOTAL FEDERAL VIEWS (2007); FPDS-NG, FEDERAL 
PROCUREMENT REPORT FY 2007: TOTAL FEDERAL VIEWS (2008).  
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B.  Korean Government Procurement 
 
1.  Overview 
 
There are three large procurement organizations in Korea: (1) the 
Public Procurement Service (PPS), (2) the Defense Acquisition Program 
Administration (DAPA), and (3) the Korea Electronic Power Corporation 
(KEPCO).  PPS, like the General Service Administration in the United 
States, performs domestic and foreign procurement including construction 
projects for almost all public organizations except DAPA and KEPCO.60  
DAPA, as an exclusive defense acquisition agency, was established in 2006 
by consolidating acquisition-related organizations in the Ministry of 
National Defense, Army, Navy, and Air Force.  DAPA procures all 
defense-related articles, materials, and supplies from domestic and foreign 
firms. 61   KEPCO, the large electric utility company, engages in the 
transmission and distribution of substantially all of the electricity in 
Korea.62  Through KEPCO’s six wholly owned generation subsidiaries, 
KEPCO also generates substantially all of the electricity produced in Korea.  
As of December 31, 2010, KEPCO and its generation subsidiaries owned 
approximately all of the electricity generating capacity in Korea.63  DAPA 
and KEPCO individually operate their own procurement systems.  
Unfortunately, there is no official data concerning this procurement, and 
more specifically, the foreign procurement KEPCO makes annually. 
 
60 PUB. PROCUREMENT SERV., 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 6–7 (S. Kor.). 
61 Seok Kim, Korean Defense Procurement from Foreign Countries and International Cooperation, 
Remarks at the International Public Procurement Conference in Seoul, South Korea (Aug. 26–28, 2010), 
available at http://www.ippa.org/IPPC4/Proceedings/03DefenseProcurement/Paper3-2.pdf. 
62 See Korea Electric Power Corp., Annual Report 17 (Form 20-F) (June 30, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/887225/000119312511178441/d20f.htm#toc203489_5. 
63 Id. 
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2.  PPS 
 
In 2009, PPS as a central procurement agency contracted for 36.9% of 
Korea’s total government procurement, and the estimated figure was 
approximately 45 trillion won ($45 billion).64  Table 6 below displays the 
amount of total government procurement in Korea, as well as PPS’s 
acquired annual procurement share. 
 
TABLE 6.  The Amount of Total Government Procurement in Korea65 
 








218,558 234,090 276,348 290,000 452,064 
PPS’s Share 
(%) 26.3 27.9 30.0 27.9 36.9 
(Unit: 100 million won) 
 
PPS’s total procurement in 2009 ($44.1 billion) was mostly comprised 
of: (1) domestic procurement ($18.84 billion); (2) foreign procurement 
($1.37 billion); and (3) construction works ($23.90 billion).66  Foreign 
procurement refers to procuring goods and services that are not 
domestically produced or supplied and, therefore, are procured through 
international tendering.67  Foreign procurement encompasses a variety of 
commodities ranging from books to sophisticated system equipment, 
including science and research equipment, state-of-the-art medical 
equipment, meteorological and environmental equipment, vehicle and 
railway equipment, and helicopters.68 
Since the effectuation of the WTO GPA in 1997, central government 
entities are required to utilize PPS for foreign procurement if the estimated 
price of such procurement exceeds $200,000.69  Korea has since adopted 
the national treatment and non-discrimination principles for domestic and 
 
64 In this Article, unless otherwise indicated, “won” refers to the currency of Korea, and “USD,” “$,” 
or “US$” refers to the currency of the United States.  Unless otherwise indicated, all translations from 
won to U.S. dollars were made at won 1,000.00 to US$1.00.  As a reference, the exchange rate as of 
July 29, 2011 was US$1.00 to won 1,053.10. 
65 PUB. PROCUREMENT SERV., 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 6 (S. Kor.). 
66 Id. at 15. 
67 Id. at 16. 
68 PUB. PROCUREMENT SERV., 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 35 (S. Kor.). 
69 PUB. PROCUREMENT SERV., 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 16 (S. Kor.). 
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foreign suppliers for goods and services covered under WTO GPA 
regulations, and therefore purchases goods and services regardless of 
domestic or foreign origin.70  Local government entities, on the other hand, 
are fully authorized to conduct foreign procurement independently since 
2008, in accordance with the government’s policy to expand autonomy in 
government procurement.71  There is no official statistical data concerning 
procurement made by local government entities.  Foreign procurement 
made in 2009 ($1.03 billion) marked a 32% increase from 2008.72  The on-
demand service and procurement for large social overhead capital projects 
may account for the increase.  Nonetheless, the foreign procurement 
actually made, as seen in Table 6, occupies a very small portion of the total 
procurements made by PPS, although the scope of the procurement opened 
to foreign firms under the WTO GPA must be much larger than the actual 
foreign procurements made.  That means that U.S. firms may have plenty 
of opportunities to penetrate the Korean procurement market with 
ratification of the KORUS FTA.  Another surprising data point relates to 
construction work.  Even if PPS procures more construction work than 
domestic procurement in terms of dollar value, it appears that no foreign 
company has ever been awarded construction work.  The reason for this is 
unknown and has never been analyzed.  Perhaps foreign firms are not 
interested in the construction-related procurement market, or they are not 
aware of how to enter the market. 
 
3.  DAPA 
 
DAPA establishes and executes a mid-term plan for defense-related 
acquisition, along with the directions, proposals, and requests by 
organizations like the Ministry of National Defense (MND), Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (JCS), Army, Navy, and Air Force.73  DAPA uses two acquisition 
methods: (1) purchase; and (2) research and development.74  The method of 
purchase is further divided into foreign and domestic purchases.  Table 7 
shows total budgets for both domestic and foreign procurements by DAPA 








70 Id. at 17. 
71 PUB. PROCUREMENT SERV., 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 35 (S. Kor.). 
72 PUB. PROCUREMENT SERV., 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 17 (S. Kor.). 
73 DAPA, 2010 ANNUAL STATISTICS 2 (S. Kor.). 
74 Id. at 36. 
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TABLE 7.  Budget for Total Procurement by DAPA 
 
Year Total Domestic Procurement 
Foreign 
Procurement 
2005 49,093 41,570 7,523 
2006 120,654 96,522 24,132 
2007 72,519 49,694 22,825 
2008 133,402 74,920 58,482 
2009 75,274 55,592 19,682 
                          (Unit: 100 million won) 
 
Table 8 shows DAPA’s foreign procurements, covering the primary 
countries from which DAPA makes acquisitions. 
 
TABLE 8.  Foreign Procurement by DAPA75 
 
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
U.S.A 796  16,617  1,774 23,626 3,978 
Russia 209  6  10 14 47 
U.K. 272  499  396 613 714 
Germany 195  606  3,684 31,370 894 
Holland 50  48  29 106 173 
France 231  140  100 244 235 
Israel 858  80  282 491 2,086 
Singapore 46  67  89 127 135 
Italy 54  20  27 39 9 
Indonesia 4  7  6 1,282 4 
Others 
(Turkey) 295  286  1,266 832 
1,919 
(1,470) 
Total 3,010  18,376  7,663 58,744 10,194 
(Unit: 100 million won) 
 
Although defense-related articles, materials, and supplies procured by 
DAPA are excluded from the scope of the WTO GPA, the volume of 
defense-related articles that DAPA procures from foreign firms accounts 
for 15%–30% of the total procurements made by DAPA.  As indicated in 
Table 8, the United States ranks first in supplying Korea with high value 
 
75 Id. at 124. 
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defense articles.  In addition, the data indicates that DAPA acquired a 
larger volume of articles through foreign procurements in 2008 than in any 
other year.  There was a specific plan in 2008 to reinforce Korean military 
forces through the mass acquisition of strategic defense-related articles, 
materials, and supplies.76 
 
V.  U.S. REGULATORY RESTRICTIONS AND BARRIERS TO 
MULTINATIONAL SUPPLIERS 
 
U.S. government procurement provides a large and lucrative market 
for the suppliers of goods and services.  However, the market is highly 
specialized, and market entry has been particularly difficult for 
“multinational suppliers”77 of non-domestic products and services because 
the system has traditionally discriminated against these firms.  Thus, it is 
necessary to examine relevant U.S. statutes and regulations to determine 
whether the KORUS FTA has precluded application of certain U.S. buy-
national restrictions78 and other barriers to Korean firms.  This analysis will 
enable Korean firms to find a better, more efficient approach for their entry 
into the federal procurement market. 
 
A.  Buy American Act 
 
In the United States, federal departments and agencies are encouraged, 
and indeed required, to “buy American.”  The Buy American Act79 (BAA) 
restricts—but does not prohibit—the purchase of supplies that are not 
“domestic end products”80 for use within the United States.81  Specifically, the 
BAA states: 
 
76 Id. at 125. 
77 For the purposes of this Article, the term “multinational suppliers” includes United States and 
overseas-based entities seeking to supply non-domestic goods and services. 
78 Examples of such buy-national restrictions include the Buy American Act and the Berry 
Amendment.  See infra Part V.A. 
79 Buy American Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 10a-10d (2011). 
80 “Domestic end product” is defined under FAR 25.003 as:  
 
(1) an unmanufactured end product mined or produced in the United States; (2) an end 
product manufactured in the United States, if (i) the cost of its components mined, 
produced, or manufactured in the United States exceeds 50 percent of the cost of all its 
components. Components of foreign origin of the same class or kind as those that the 
agency determines are not mined, produced, or manufactured in sufficient and 
reasonably available commercial quantities of a satisfactory quality are treated as 
domestic . . . .  
 
See 48 C.F.R. § 25.003 (2012).  The FAR is the primary document in the Federal Acquisition 
Regulations System that contains uniform policies and procedures governing the acquisition activity of 
all federal agencies that do not have a specific exemption (such as the Federal Aviation Administration 
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Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and unless the head 
of the department or independent establishment concerned shall 
determine it to be inconsistent with the public interest, or the cost 
to be unreasonable, only such unmanufactured articles, materials, 
and supplies as have been mined or produced in the United 
States, and only such manufactured articles, materials, and 
suppliers as have been manufactured in the United States 
substantially all from articles, materials, or supplies mined, 
produced, or manufactured, as the case may be, in the United 
States, shall be acquired for public use.82 
 
The BAA also requires every contract for the construction, alteration, 
or repair of any public building or public work in the United States to 
purchase domestic end products.83  The penalties are severe for contractors, 
subcontractors, material men, or suppliers who fail to comply with this 
statutory section: they can be denied public contracts for the construction of 
public buildings for “three years after such findings [of the violation are] 
made public.”84 
In addition to the BAA, Congress has required the DoD to use a 
domestic source in purchases of certain supplies under what is commonly 
referred to as the Berry Amendment.85  These restrictions preclude the DoD 
from using its appropriations on certain non-domestic articles and items, 
such as “food[,] clothing and the materials and components thereof . . . [,] 
tents[], tarpaulins,[] covers[,] cotton[,] and other natural fiber products.”86  
The Berry Amendment, however, sets forth a group of exceptions ranging 
from an “[a]vailability exception”87 and exempting certain procurements 
made “outside the United States”88 to a commissary resale exception.89 
 
and the Postal Service).  The FAR is prepared, issued, and maintained jointly by the Secretary of 
Defense, the Administrator of General Services, and the NASA Administrator.  See NASH ET AL., supra 
note 51, at 252–53. 
81 48 C.F.R. § 25.001 (2012). 
82 Buy American Act, 41 U.S.C. § 10a (2011). 
83 Id. § 10b(a). 
84 Id. § 10b(b). 
85 For a detailed history and background information of the Berry Amendment, see Sean P. 
Bamford, The Persistence of Time: A Brief History and Analysis of the Berry Amendment, 32 PUB. 
CONT. L.J. 577 (2002–2003). 
86 10 U.S.C. § 2533a (2013). 
87 Id. § 2533a(c) (“Subsection (a) does not apply to the extent that the Secretary of Defense or the 
Secretary of the military department concerned determines that satisfactory quality and sufficient 
quantity of any such article or item described in subsection (b) grown, reprocessed, reused, or produced 
in the United States cannot be procured as and when needed at United States market prices.”). 
88 Id. § 2533a(d) (“Subsection (a) does not apply to the following: (1) Procurements outside the 
United States in support of combat operations or procurements of any item . . . in support of 
contingency operations.”). 
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B.  Exceptions to the BAA 
 
The BAA contains the following three major exceptions that allow a 
contracting officer to acquire a foreign end product without regard to the 
restrictions of the Buy American policy: (1) public interest; (2) 
nonavailability (also known as a nonavailability waiver); and (3) 
unreasonable cost.90 
 
1. Public Interest Exception 
 
Under the public interest exception, “the head of the agency may 
make a determination that domestic preference would be inconsistent with 
the public interest.”91  Specifically, “[t]his exception applies when an 
agency has an agreement with a foreign government that provides an 
exception to the [BAA].”92  For instance, the DoD has entered into a MoU 
with relevant authorities of twenty-one countries.93  As a result of the MoU 
and other international agreements, the DoD observed that it is inconsistent 
with the public interest to apply the BAA restrictions to the acquisition of 
“qualifying country end products.”94  With this public interest exception, 
the DoD has issued “blanket,” rather than case-by-case, waivers of the 
BAA restrictions that cover prospective DoD purchases of non-domestic 
goods from the above-mentioned countries.95  As Korea is not yet a part of 
the MoU, Korean end products are not treated as qualifying country end 
products. 
 
2.  Nonavailability Waivers Exception 
 
The BAA does not apply with respect to articles, materials, or supplies 
if they, “either as end items or components, are not mined, produced, or 
manufactured in the United States in sufficient and reasonably available 
 
89 Id. § 2533a(g) (“Subsection (a) does not apply to items purchased for resale purposes in 
commissaries . . . .”). 
90 See FAR 25.103 (2011); see also 41 U.S.C. § 10a (2011). 
91 See FAR 25.103(a) (2011). 
92 Id. 
93 For the list of twenty-one countries, see supra note 46. 
94 For this purpose, a qualifying country end product is defined as “an end product manufactured in 
a qualifying country if the cost of the [components manufactured in a qualifying country or the United 
States (plus the cost of any components of foreign origin that are deemed unavailable domestically)] 
exceeds 50 percent of the cost of all its components.” DFARS 252.225-700 (2009). A “qualifying 
country” is one of the twenty-one countries listed.  See supra note 46. 
95 John A. Howell, The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 Versus the Buy American Act: The 
Irresistible Force Meets the Immovable Object, 35 PUB. CONT. L.J. 495, 498 (2006). 
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commercial quantities and of a satisfactory quality.”96   Two types of 
nonavailability waivers are available: class determinations and individual 
determinations.97  With respect to class determinations, approximately 100 
articles have been determined unavailable as listed in the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR).98  This determination does not necessarily 
mean that there is no domestic source for the listed items, but that domestic 
sources can only meet fifty percent or less of the total U.S. government and 
nongovernment demand.99  As for individual determinations, the “head of 
the contracting activity may make a determination that an article, material, 
or supply is not mined, produced, or manufactured in the United States in 
sufficient and reasonably available commercial quantities of a satisfactory 
quality.”100  For both types of waivers, the contracting officer must prepare 
a report supporting the nonavailability determination unless the acquisition 
was conducted through the use of full and open competition and the agency 
also did not receive an offer of a domestic end product.101  It is unclear 
what type of Korean items fall within this nonavailability exception. 
 
3.  Unreasonable Cost Exception 
 
Under the unreasonable cost exception, “the contracting officer may 
determine that the cost of a domestic end product would be 
unreasonable.”102  If there is a domestic offer that is not the low offer, and 
the restrictions of the BAA should apply to the lowest offer (the offer of 
which might be non-domestic end product), then the contracting officer 
must determine the reasonableness of the cost of the domestic offer in 
comparison with the non-domestic offer.103  The contracting officer should 
add a price differential (called an “evaluation factor”) of six percent (if the 
lowest domestic offer is from a large business concern) or twelve percent 
(if the lowest domestic offer is from a small business concern), as 
appropriate, to the price of the lowest non-domestic offer.104  Subsequently, 
the price of the domestic offer is deemed reasonable if that price does not 
exceed the evaluated price of the lowest offer (for the non-domestic end 
product) after adding the appropriate evaluation factor.105  If a multinational 
 
96 FAR 25.103(b) (2011); see also 41 U.S.C. § 10a (2011). 
97 FAR 25.103(b)(1)–(2) (2011). 
98 FAR 25.104(a)–(b) (2011) (“The list will be published in the Federal Register for public 
comment no less frequently than once every five years.”). 
99 FAR 25.103(b)(1) (2011). 
100 FAR 25.103(b)(2)(i) (2011). 
101 FAR 25.103(b)(3) (2011). 
102 FAR 25.103(c) (2008). 
103 FAR 25.105(b) (2008). 
104 FAR 25.105(b) (2008).  The DoD uses an evaluation factor of fifty percent.  DFARS 225.105(b) 
(revised 2008). 
105 FAR 25.105(c) (2008). 
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bidder is able to overcome the preferential price differentials, then the BAA 
normally permits some access by the multinational bidder of non-domestic 
goods to the procurement market.  Consequently, in practice, “the BAA has 
been construed not as a procurement ban, but as a mandated preference for 
domestic articles, because it requires the addition of the price differentials 
to all contract offers involving a non-domestic product for the purpose of 
evaluation.”106 
If the acquisition is subject to a trade agreement such as the WTO 
GPA or FTAs, then the contracting officer may not apply the evaluation 
factors to offers of the so-called eligible products, i.e., foreign end products 
that, owing to the applicability of such trade agreements to a particular 
acquisition, are not subject to discriminatory treatment.107  Consequently, 
because Korea is a member of the WTO GPA, the evaluation factors will 
not be applied to Korean end products anyway, regardless of whether the 
KORUS FTA is ratified. 
 
C.  The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 
 
1.  Waiver of the BAA 
 
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 authorizes the President to waive 
the Buy American Act procurement restrictions and other discriminatory 
provisions for eligible products from countries that have signed an 
international agreement with the United States, such as the WTO GPA or 
FTAs.108  The President has delegated this waiver authority to the United 
States Trade Representative (USTR).109  The Trade Agreements Act (TAA) 
implements the United States’ obligations under the WTO GPA—as 
approved by Congress in the Uruguay Round Agreements Act110—with 
respect to federal procurement covered by the government entities. 
As noted earlier, the KORUS FTA’s Chapter 17 requires the 
elimination of “buy national” restrictions on the procurement of certain 
goods and services by federal government agencies and government-
controlled enterprises of both countries.  Thus, the U.S. Congress will need 
to amend various sections of the TAA and relevant regulations to address 
the KORUS FTA’s provisions on federal procurement once the KORUS 
 
106 Corr & Zissis, supra note 8, at 321. 
107 FAR 25.105(a)(2) (2008).  Definitions for “eligible product” and “foreign end product” can be 
found in FAR 25.003. 
108 19 U.S.C. § 2511 (1979); see also FAR 25.402 (2008). 
109 FAR 25.402 (2008). 
110 The WTO and the WTO GPA are the successors to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 
and the Agreement on Government Procurement (AGP), respectively.  The TAA originally 
implemented the AGP, which the United States signed in April 1979 as a part of the Tokyo Round of 
multilateral trade negotiations.  See Howell, supra note 95, at 500. 
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FTA is ratified.  To implement Chapter 17, Congress must also amend the 
TAA and relevant regulations to include and designate Korea, who 
provides “appropriate reciprocal competitive government procurement 
opportunities to the United States’ products and suppliers of such 
products,”111 as an eligible candidate for the waiver of Buy American-type 
statutes and regulations. 
 
2.  Exceptions 
 
Under FAR 25.401, the TAA does not apply to several acquisitions (in 
other words, Korean firms will not be eligible for waiver of the Buy 
American), including but not limited to: (1) acquisitions set aside for small 
businesses; and (2) acquisitions of arms, ammunition, or war materials, or 
purchases indispensable for national security or for national defense 
purposes.112  It appears that these TAA exceptions are consistent with that 
of Chapter 17 of the KORUS FTA.113 
 
VI.  KOREAN GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT REGULATIONS 
AND PROCESS 
 
A.  The Relevant Statutes and Regulations 
 
Korea does not have a law comparable to the Buy American Act and 
follows a global standard in its government procurement process.  
Nonetheless, foreign firms’ participation in government procurement has 
been minor though it has increased recently.114  There are presumably a 
couple of primary reasons for this.  First, the size of the procurement 
market was not large enough to attract foreign firms.  Second, the language 
barrier was a big obstacle to any interested foreign firms. 
As the WTO GPA took effect in Korea as of January 1, 1997, Korea 
legislated the “Act on Contracts to Which the State is a Party”115 for 
domestic implementation of the WTO GPA, followed by the promulgation 
of the Enforcement Decree116 of the Act.  The Act covers government 
procurement contracts by means of international tender (in other words, 
foreign contracts) as well as domestic contracts. 117   The scope of 
 
111 19 U.S.C. § 2511(b)(1)–(2) (1979). 
112 FAR 25.401(a) (2008). 
113 Cf. KORUS FTA, supra note 1, Annex 17-A. 
114 See supra Tables 6, 7, and 8. 
115 국가를 당사자로 하는 계약에 관한 법률 [Act on Contracts to Which the State is a Party], Act 
No. 12028, Aug. 13, 2013, (S. Kor.) [hereinafter Act on Contracts]. 
116 국가를 당사자로 하는 계약에 관한 법률 시행령 [Enforcement Decree of the Act on 
Litigation to Which the State is a Party], Presidential Decree No. 25033, Dec. 30, 2013 (S. Kor.) 
[hereinafter Presidential Decree]. 
117 Act on Contracts, supra note 115, art. 2. 
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government procurement contracts by means of international tender shall 
include such contracts for commodities, construction works, or services 
entered into by a government agency, the value of which is equal to or 
exceeding the amount notified by the Minister of Strategy and Finance in 
accordance with the government procurement agreements.118  However, 
there are four exceptions that are excluded from the government 
procurement contracts by means of international tender.119  Among the four 
exceptions, the two most relevant ones here are: (1) cases of manufacturing 
and purchasing small and medium enterprise-manufactured products in 
accordance with the “Facilitation of Purchase of Small and Medium 
Enterprise-Manufactured Products Act,”120 and (2) such other matters as 
prescribed in a form of presidential decree.121 
The “Regulations on Special Cases on the Enforcement Decree” was 
enacted in 1996 to implement the WTO GPA. 122   The Regulations 
specifically provide three major types of procurement contracts that are 
excluded from the means of international tender.123  They are as follows: (1) 
any cases necessary for the protection of national security interests relating 
to the procurement of arms, ammunition or war materials, or for 
procurement indispensable for national security or for national defense 
purposes; (2) any cases necessary to protect public morals, order or safety, 
human, animal or plant life or health or intellectual property; or (3) any 
cases procuring the products or services of handicapped persons, of 
philanthropic institutions or of prison labor.124 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Act states that the head of each 
central government agency, if deemed necessary in view of the nature and 
the purpose of the contract, may conduct the procurement by means of 
international tender under the provisions of the presidential decree.125  Thus, 
the Regulations provide its basis in detail so that the following cases may 
be contracted by means of international tender: (1) any cases necessary for 
prevention of defective construction works; (2) any cases not being able to 
accomplish the purpose of procurement due to non-availability from 
domestic sources; or (3) the procurement by means of international tender 
 
118 Id. art. 4(1). 
119 Id. 
120 중소기업제품 구매촉진 및 판로지원에 관한 법률 [Facilitation of Purchase of Small and 
Medium Enterprise-Manufactured Products Act], Act No. 12008, Aug. 6, 2013, (S. Kor.) [hereinafter 
Small & Medium Enterprise Act].  See also Act on Contracts, supra note 115, art. 4(1)2. 
121 Act on Contracts, supra note 115, art. 4(1)4. 
122 특정조달을 위한 국가를 당사자로 하는 계약에 관한 법률 시행령 특례규정 [Enforcement 
Decree of the Act on Contracts to Which the State is a Party], Presidential Decree No. 24728, Sept. 17, 
2013, (S. Kor.) [hereinafter The Regulations]. 
123 These exceptions were made in accordance with the Act on Contracts, supra note 115, art. 
4(1)(4). 
124 The Regulations, supra note 122, art. 3(2). 
125 Act on Contracts, supra note 115, art. 4(3). 
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deems to be necessary in view of the nature and the purpose of the contract.126 
The Regulations provide a detailed process for foreign procurement, 
along with other “Administrative Rules on Special Cases on the 
Enforcement Decree.”127  Thus, the foreign procurement process shall be 
subject to the detailed rules provided by the Regulations and the 
Administrative Rules.  In the event that the Regulations and the 
Administrative Rules are silent on a specific issue, however, any interested 
party can look to the Act and the Enforcement Decree of the Act.  This 
mechanism is applicable to both the PPS and the DAPA. 
The Regulations adopt many provisions in the WTO GPA, including 
but not limited to: (1) the national treatment and non-discrimination 
principle; (2) special and different treatment for developing countries; (3) 
the same methods of procurement as the WTO GPA, such as open 
tendering, selective tendering, or limited tendering; (4) establishment of 
international contract dispute conciliation committee; and (5) any special 
cases and rules for free trade agreements made with foreign countries.128  
Thus, the foreign procurement itself, in terms of process and scheme, is 
similar to that of the WTO GPA. 
 
B.  Procurement Process—Establishment of KONEPS 
 
PPS, DAPA, and KEPCO have individually implemented e-
procurement systems for their own use.129  Although these implementations 
improved procurement administration to some extent, such separate 
implementations by individual organizations showed an issue of redundant 
investment and the lack of uniform standards.  Because of the lack of a 
single window to government procurement, “inconveniences for suppliers 
and public organizations persisted, and suppliers had to collect public 
tender information from various sources.”130  Moreover, “the lack of a data 
exchange system among public organizations imposed on suppliers the cost 
and time to have bid-related certificates issued and submitted to each 
organization.”131 
In 2002, PPS launched the Korea ON-line E-Procurement System 
(KONEPS) in order to resolve these problems.  KONEPS is significant 
because it “serves as the single window for public procurement that handles 
the entire procurement procedure online from bidding and contracting to 
 
126 The Regulations, supra note 122, art. 3(5). 
127 특정조달을 위한 국가를 당사자로 하는 계약에 관한 법률 시행 특례규칙 [Administrative 
Rules on Special Cases on Enforcement Decree], Administrative Rules No. 327 (S. Kor.) [hereinafter 
The Administrative Rules]. 
128 정원, 공공조달계약법 [PUBLIC PROCUREMENT LAW] 363 (법률문화원 [Legal Culture Instit.], 
2009) (S. Kor.). 
129 PUB. PROCUREMENT SERV., 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 63 (S. Kor.). 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
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payment via the internet.”132  Furthermore, KONEPS allows “the shared 
use by public organizations of bidder registration information . . . With a 
single registration, suppliers can participate in all bids by all public 
organizations including the central government, local autonomies and state 
invested corporations.”133 
As of 2009, 40,861 public organizations and 191,643 private firms 
used KONEPS, with a daily access count of over 186,000.134  Notably, 
“[t]he total volume of transactions conducted through KONEPS amounted 
to 85.7 trillion won [approximately $85 billion in 2009], of which 
centralized procurement by PPS accounts for 44 trillion won, and 
independent procurement by individual procuring entities constitute 41.7 
trillion won.”135  Public organizations are required to publish all tender 
notices through KONEPS’s internet site.  Some public institutions, such as 
DAPA and KEPCO, individually operate their own procurement systems.  
Through data exchange linkage, however, tender notices published by such 
institutions are also published through KONEPS. KONEPS published 
330,000 tender notices in 2008, of which 280,000 tender notices were 
published solely through KONEPS.136 
The establishment of KONEPS has drastically increased the 
transparency in the public procurement administration.137  The release of all 
procurement information through the single window of KONEPS allows an 
easy comparison among the tendering methods and specifications of each 
public institution, and private businesses are able to monitor any factors 
that may restrict fair competition.  Standardized work process through the 
digitalized system established a foundation for transparent and fair 
procurement administration.138  As e-Procurement eliminated face-to-face 
contacts between the supplier and contracting officer, transparency in 
procurement administration could be ensured.  With the common 
reorganization of the benefits of e-Procurement such as convenience and 
cost savings in both the public and the private sectors, e-Procurement 







132 Id. at 65. 
133 Id. 
134 PUB. PROCUREMENT SERV., ANNUAL REPORT 30 (2009). 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 PUB. PROCUREMENT SERV., ANNUAL REPORT 67 (2008). 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
CHUNG_FINAL_WEB.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/20/14 7:36 PM 




VII.  BETTER OPTIONS FOR PRIVATE FIRMS OF BOTH 
COUNTRIES 
 
A.  From Korean Firms’ Perspective 
 
The KORUS FTA appears to expand more portions of the U.S. 
procurement markets for accessibility by the Korean firms in comparison 
with the WTO GPA.  After a review of the relevant U.S. statutes and 
regulations, the U.S. regulatory restrictions and barriers remain the same as 
before the KORUS FTA was executed, with the exception of the 
prohibition on required prior work experience in the territory of the United 
States. 
Considering all the circumstances, we need to explore where Korean 
firms should primarily concentrate to further pursue effective government 
contracting with Unites States agencies in the KORUS FTA era.  First, 
Chapter 17 does not apply to products and services valued below the set-
forth threshold amount.  As shown in Table 3, procurements with dollar 
values of more than $100,000 occupy at least 90% of the total dollar values.  
In light of the dollar values subject to KORUS FTA, Korean firms appear 
to have tremendous opportunities. 
Second, Chapter 17 does not apply to any set-asides for small and 
disadvantaged (minority-owned) business firms, whose dollar values will 
be roughly 20% among the total dollar values for fiscal year 2007.140  The 
set-asides for small and disadvantaged businesses may typically include the 
10% dollar value, which is reserved for less than $100,000 of the threshold 
amount.  In theory, the Korean firms will likely be accessible to more than 
the major parts of the procurement markets. 
However, if we consider the exclusion of national defense-related 
products and services from Chapter 17, the accessible portions available to 
the Korean firms will decrease significantly, because the DoD is the largest 
purchaser in the federal procurement market.141  The DoD may procure a 
certain portion of non-defense-related products and services as well, which 
will be subject to Chapter 17 through the General Service Administration’s 
program (discussed below).  If such data were available, then an estimate 
could be made as to which portions among the entire procurement markets 
will be opened to the Korean firms under the KORUS FTA.  Unfortunately, 
such data is not available. 
Based on the above analysis, what strategies must the Korean firms 
take to increase government contracting?  Korean firms should consider the 
 
140 See generally FPDS-NG, FEDERAL PROCUREMENT REPORT FY 2006: TOTAL FEDERAL VIEWS (2007) 
(while the dollar value for small and disadvantaged business firms is roughly 20% of the total dollar 
values for purchases in fiscal year 2006, the number of actions is roughly 40% out of the total number 
of actions reported). 
141 As seen supra in Table 4, the total dollar amount reserved for the DoD is more than 70%. 
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following: (1) concentrating on the General Service Administration’s 
Federal Supply Schedule Program (Multiple Award Schedule Program); (2) 
exploring subcontracting opportunities with U.S. prime contractors; and (3) 
seeking strategic alliance with small and minority businesses in the United 
States to enter its procurement market.  Additionally, Korean firms should: 
(1) learn about the federal procurement process; (2) carefully analyze their 
own products and services to determine whether they can be competitive in 
the market; (3) select the right products and services based on the careful 
analysis; (4) market the selected products and services toward potential 
customers and various government agencies; and (5) satisfy the customers’ 
various needs and requests. 
 
1.  General Service Administration’s Federal Supply Schedule 
Program (Multiple Award Schedule Program) 
 
The General Service Administration’s (GSA) 142  “Federal Supply 
Schedule Program”143 might be a good option for Korean firms.  The FAR 
describes the Federal Supply Schedule Program as follows: 
 
The Federal Supply Schedule program, pursuant to 41 U.S.C. 
259(b)(3)(A), provides Federal agencies with a simplified 
process of acquiring commercial supplies and services in varying 
quantities while obtaining volume discounts.  Indefinite-delivery 
contracts144 are awarded using competitive procedures to firms. 
The firms provide supplies and services at stated prices for given 
periods of time, for delivery within a stated geographic area such 
as the 48 contiguous states, the District of Columbia, Alaska, 
Hawaii, and overseas.145 
 
The Federal Supply Service (FSS), a division of GSA, manages and 
operates the Federal Supply Schedule Program. 146  The FSS awards 
 
142 The GSA is an agency within the executive branch that acquires supplies and services (including 
construction) that are commonly used by many agencies.  See NASH ET AL., supra note 51, at 290. 
143 The GSA proposed this Program in the 1950s as a solution to the Government’s purchasing problems.  
See JOHN W. CHIERICHELLA & JONATHAN S. ARONIE, MULTIPLE AWARD SCHEDULE CONTRACTING 42 
(Xlibris Corp. 2006). 
144 An indefinite-delivery contract is a type of contract in which the time of delivery is unspecified 
in the original contract, but established by the contracting officer during performance.  FAR subpart 
16.5 contains guidance on three types of indefinite-delivery contracts: (1) definite-quantity contracts; 
(2) requirement contracts; and (3) indefinite-quantity contracts.  FAR 16.501-2 states that “the 
appropriate type of indefinite-delivery contract may be used . . . when the exact times and/or quantities 
of future deliveries are not known at the time of contract award.”  See NASH ET AL., supra note 51, at 
319. 
145 FAR 38.101(a) (2012). 
146 FAR 38.201 (2012). 
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contracts under the “negotiated procurement procedures.”147  If a contractor 
wishes to be an eligible vendor to the Federal Supply Schedule program in 
order to provide its supplies and services, it should obtain in advance an 
approval from FSS for a schedule contract.148 
The primary objective of the program is to provide contracting 
activities (or buying officers) with a simplified process for acquiring 
“commercial” 149  supplies and services at a discounted price.  This 
procurement process allows the agency-buying offices to “purchase needed 
supplies and services with shorter lead times, lower administrative costs, 
and reduced inventories.”150  The Federal Supply Schedule Program offers 
several benefits, including but not limited to: (1) the “buying offices are not 
required to perform solicitation or procurement procedures for the federal 
supply schedule items because FSS has already determined the prices to be 
fair and reasonable;”151  (2) agency-buying offices are not required to 
synopsize their orders in “FedBizOpps;”152 and (3) the Program enables 
“the government to use its buying power to obtain volume discounts on 
purchases.”153 
The most common federal supply schedule program is the Multiple 
Award Schedule (MAS) Program.  A MAS is “a list of contracts that the 
government establishes with more than one contractor for the same types of 
supplies and services.”154  GSA awards multiple contracts, hence the term 
“Multiple Award Schedule,” for identical items as long as the prices are 
fair and reasonable from the contracting officer’s view.155 
 
147 See SCOTT A. STANBERRY, FEDERAL CONTRACTING MADE EASY 210 (2d ed., Management 
Concepts 2004) (“The federal government uses negotiated procurement procedures to make competitive 
acquisitions when it prefers to hold discussions with offerers before making a final source selection. 
Negotiated procurement procedures, unlike sealed bidding procedures, permit bargaining and afford 
offerers the opportunity to revise their offers before the award of a contract. It is the federal 
government’s most flexible procurement method.”). 
148 Id. at 118. 
149 The supplies and services offered under the Program must be “commercial.”  General Service 
Administration Regulation, 48 C.F.R. § 538.271(a) (2012).  In other words, they must meet the 
definition of a “commercial item,” which is “[a]ny item, other than real property, that is of a type 
customarily used by the general public or by non-governmental entities for purposes other than 
governmental purposes, and (i) has been sold, leased, or licensed to the general public; or (ii) has been 
offered for sale, lease, or license to the general public.”  See FAR 2.101(b) (2012). 
150 STANBERRY, supra note 147, at 118. 
151 Id. at 120. 
152 Federal Business Opportunities (FedBizOpps or FBOs) is a single government point of entry for 
federal government procurement opportunities of over $25,000.  Government buyers can publicize their 
business opportunities by posting information directly to the FedBizOpps website.  Through one portal, 
commercial vendors seeking federal markets for their products and services can search, monitor, and 
retrieve opportunities solicited by the entire federal contracting community.  See NASH ET AL., supra 
note 51, at 256. 
153 STANBERRY, supra note 147, at 119. 
154 Id. at 120. 
155 CHIERICHELLA & ARONIE, supra note 143, at 43. 
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The MAS Program has been “providing ordering agencies with the 
flexibility to select the best value item that meets their needs at the lowest 
overall cost.”156  With this program, the agency does not need to develop a 
statement of work, issue a request for proposals, and conduct a 
competition.157  In short, once GSA uses a MAS contract, the buying 
agencies conveniently order directly from the vendor. 
As of May 2009, the GSA administered more than 41 Schedules.158  
There are Schedules for financial and business solutions (Schedule 520), 
office furniture (Schedule 71 I), leasing of automobiles and light trucks 
(Schedule 751), etc. 159   The GSA administers “approximately 8,000 
Schedule contracts (held by approximately 3,000 companies), covering 
more than 4 million different commercial supplies and services.”160 
The GSA reports that sales through the MAS Program amount to 
“more than $30 billion annually.” 161   The program historically “has 
accounted for over 10% of all federal purchases or procurements.”162  The 
Program has been “open to all executive branch agencies, independent 
federal agencies, military branches, mixed ownership Government 
corporations, and a host of other entities,”163 including but not limited to (1) 
certain non-federal firefighting organizations; (2) tribes and tribal 
organizations; (3) certain educational institutions; (4) insular governments 
like American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the Virgin 
Islands; and (5) the Red Cross.164 
Having been awarded a schedule contract “does not guarantee that the 
[contractor] will receive government orders.” 165   The award merely 
indicates that the contractor is eligible to respond to solicitations to be 
issued by various federal agencies and institutions and that the approved 
“supplies and services are reasonably priced.”166  Therefore, the approved 
contractor should immediately turn their attention to marketing their new 
award toward potential purchasers, by developing and providing a contract 
price list or catalog.  Korean firms should seek potential business under the 
program, considering its fairly large size, the benefits described earlier, and 




158 For a complete list of the Schedules, see Schedule List, GSA FED. ACQUISITION SERV., 
http://www.gsaelibrary.gsa.gov/ElibMain/scheduleList.do (last visited May 9, 2014). 
159 Id. 
160 CHIERICHELLA & ARONIE, supra note 143, at 35. 
161 Id. at 45. 
162 STANBERRY, supra note 147, at 118. 
163 CHIERICHELLA & ARONIE, supra note 143, at 48–49. 
164 Id. at 49. 
165 STANBERRY, supra note 147, at 124. 
166 Id. 
167 한국무역협회[KOREAN INT’L TRADE ASSOC.], 아는만큼 성공하는 해외조달 시장 이야기 [FOR 
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appears that there are a lot of items in which Korean firms could be 
competitive in terms of price and quality.  A separate detailed article is 
required to elaborate on the procedure to become a contractor (or vendor) 
under the MAS Program. 
 
2.  Subcontracting Opportunities with U.S. Prime Contractors 
According to Stanberry 
 
When a company enters into a contract to perform work for a 
customer (or the government in this case), and another firm provides a 
portion of the goods or services necessary to fulfill the contract, the 
company is said to be subcontracting part of its contractual requirements.  
The company’s contract with the government is usually referred to as the 
prime contract, and the company’s contracts with its suppliers are referred 
to as subcontracts.  The subcontractor does not have a direct contractual 
relationship with the government.  Some examples of the major prime 
contractors in the procurement market include, but are not limited to, 
Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Cisco, General Dynamics, and 
Westinghouse.168 
Korean firms need to utilize sub-contracting with prime contractors as 
a method of increasing its accessibility to and opportunities in the U.S. 
procurement market.169  Particularly, Korean firms contracting in military 
support, parts, and related technology and products should seek 
subcontracting opportunities from the relevant prime contractors in the 
United States, considering the tremendous amount of procurements carried 
out by the DoD every year.  As discussed earlier, most of the procurements 
made by the DoD are not covered under the WTO GPA or the KORUS 
FTA, and consequently Korean firms’ accessibility is substantially limited.  
However, with this subcontracting business along with the use of U.S. 
prime contractors, Korean firms may be able to circumvent the restrictions 
and barriers concerning defense-related products in the procurement 
market, as well as penetrate the sizeable market for defense-related 
products. 
 
3.  Strategic Alliance with Small and Minority Businesses in the 
United States 
 
As noted in Part III.C, the Korean and U.S. governments reached an 
agreement to exclude any set-aside for small and minority-owned 
businesses under the KORUS FTA, even if the relevant procurement 
 
SUCCESS OF OVERSEAS GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT] 72 (2009) [hereinafter FOR SUCCESS OF OVERSEAS 
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT] (S. Kor.).  
168 STANBERRY, supra note 147, at 110. 
169 FOR SUCCESS OF OVERSEAS GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT, supra note 167, at 82–83. 
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exceeded the $100,000 threshold.  To ensure that small businesses get their 
fair share of federal government purchases, statutory goals have been 
established for federal agencies under the Small Business Act of 1953.  For 
example, approximately 25% of a federal agency’s $40 million budget 
would cumulatively go towards small business in general, small 
disadvantaged businesses, and small women-owned businesses. 170  
However, this does not mean that it is impossible for Korean firms to 
participate as set-aside businesses. 
Korean firms may need to consider strategic alliances with U.S. small-
sized firms owned and operated by the Korean Americans.171  The form of 
strategic alliance may include a partnership or joint venture between a 
Korean firm and a Korean-American firm.  Since Korean-American firms 
fall within the category of “small or minority-owned business firms,”172 
joint participation between Korean firms and Korean-American business in 
the procurement process will provide Korean firms with the benefits 
exclusively available to small or minority-owned businesses.173  The size of 
a Korean firm (being large rather than small) will not be an issue as long as 
a small Korean-American business takes part in the bidding process 
reserved for small, minority-owned businesses.  Thus, this is another 
avenue for Korean firms to develop a new procurement market. 
 
B.  From U.S. Firms’ Perspective 
 
The KORUS FTA expands U.S. firms’ accessibility to the Korean 
procurement markets compared to the WTO GPA.  Based on the statistics 
 
170 See STANBERRY, supra note 147, at 65–66. 
171 “Korean American” refers to an American citizen of Korean descent.  In 2010, approximately 
1.7 million Korean Americans were living in a U.S. territory.  See Growth of Multi-Racial Korean 
Americans, KOREANAMERICANSTORY.ORG, http://www.koreanamericanstory.org/index.php?option=com_ 
content&view=article&id=199&Itemid=134 (last visited May 9, 2014). 
172 The Small Business Administration (SBA) defines a “small business” as one that is organized 
for profit, has a place of business “in the United States or its outlying areas,” and “makes a significant 
contribution to the U.S. economy through payment of taxes or use of American products, materials or 
labor, etc.”  48 C.F.R. § 19.001 (2009).  The business may be a sole proprietorship as well as a 
“partnership, corporation, joint venture, association, or cooperative.”  Id.  The SBA has established 
numerical definitions, called “size standards,” for every industry in the U.S. economy under the North 
American Industry Classification System (NAICS).  The NAICS is used to identify these industries.  13 
C.F.R. § 121.101 (2009).  An industry is coded with a six-digit number, such as 541330 for Engineering 
Services.  See 13 C.F.R. § 121.101 (2009).  A size standard, which is usually stated in terms of the 
number of employees or average annual receipts, represents the largest size that a business (including 
its subsidiaries and affiliates) can be in order to remain classified as a small business for SBA and 
Federal contracting programs.  All the Federal agencies must use SBA size standards for contracts 
identified as small business.  See id. 
173 이미정, 미국 정부조달시장 현황 및 진출전략, 미국 연방조달청 및 World Bank 초청 
설명회 자료 [Status of the United States Government Procurement Market and Strategies for Korean 
Companies, Presentation Materials made for Invitation of the U.S. General Service Administration and 
World Bank] 24 (2007) (S. Kor.). 
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shown above, theoretically, the KORUS FTA may present U.S. firms with 
numerous opportunities to increase their shares in the Korean market.  One 
may wonder, however, how many U.S. firms are interested in the market 
and whether these firms are price-competitive to Korean firms.  It is 
difficult to answer these questions.  On one hand, few U.S. firms appear to 
be interested in the Korean procurement market, and even those companies 
that are interested in the Korean procurement market are not quite aware of 
the market size.  On the other hand, many Korean small and mid-sized 
firms are very interested in the U.S. procurement market and strive to 
increase their entry into that market.  Further, the Korean government and 
relevant agencies provide Korean firms with as much support and 
assistance as possible, including various educational programs and 
consulting services.174 
Moreover, it appears the competitiveness of the commodities 
produced by U.S. firms is far behind those of Korean firms in terms of 
price and quality in the procurement market (where the government 
generally seeks the lowest possible price).175  Thus, even if such U.S. firms 
are interested in the Korean procurement market, it will be difficult for 
them to penetrate the market due to low price competitiveness.  That being 
said, many U.S. firms are deemed to be strong and competitive in some 
service sectors that are not dealt with by Korean firms.  U.S. firms should 
make an effort to find those service sectors in the Korean procurement 
market and concentrate on them.  Such U.S. firms may need to consider 
strategic alliance with Korean firms that have some knowledge and 
experience in the relevant service sectors and are interested in expanding 
their businesses to those sectors.  The form of strategic alliance may 
include a partnership or joint venture. 
U.S. firms may also face language and cultural barriers during their 
participation in the Korean procurement process.  The Regulations provide 
a rule relating to the use of language in the course of foreign procurement.  
Article 8 of the Regulations specifies that, in principle, the Korean 
language should be used; however, if the suppliers of goods are located in a 
specific country and the use of a foreign language is necessary, the 
language to be used shall be that of the country, English, French, or 
Spanish.176  Further, the head of a central government agency or the 
contracting officer may provide the following items in English, French, or 
Spanish at the end of the public notice of tender for the foreign 
 
174 The Korea International Trade Association and Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency, 
which are the two primary government-sponsored entities for the promotion of trade, offer many 
educational seminars and consulting services to support and assist Korean firms as they enter the U.S. 
government procurement market. 
175 This assertion is based on the general perception that Korean-made goods are priced cheaper 
than those made in the United States. 
176 The Regulations, supra note 122, art. 8.1. 
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procurement: (1) the specific goods to be procured; (2) the deadline of 
tender documents and/or applications; and (3) the name and address of the 
procuring entity.177  English must be the primary language used in most 
procurement processes.  However, most contracting officers in Korea do 
not speak English fluently.  Thus, language issues will likely have some 
effect on the success of dedicated U.S. firms in the Korean procurement 
market.  As a way to resolve the language issue, any interested U.S. firms 
may want to engage a local Korean agent.  The local agent may also help to 
resolve cultural barriers, if any, that U.S. firms may face in the course of 
procurement. 
As shown under Table 8 in Part IV.B above, the United States is the 
first country from which DAPA purchases the most defense-related articles, 
materials, and supplies in a foreign procurement.178  U.S. firms may need to 
focus on that area to increase the volume of the transactions.  However, 
DAPA has a long-term policy to support domestic defense-related industry, 
and thus, its purchase of foreign primary parts may actually decrease.179  
Because the defense-related articles, materials, and supplies are not subject 
to the WTO GPA or the KORUS FTA, the prospect of U.S. firms’ increase 
in this area does not appear promising. 
 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
 
The U.S. government spends a tremendous amount on products and 
services, and that expenditure increases every year in terms of transaction 
volume and dollar amount.  It is true that Chapter 17 of the KORUS FTA 
further expands the scope of coverage by significantly lowering the 
threshold amount, when compared with the WTO GPA, although the state 
government level procurement is not included.  It is also true that Korean 
firms will not readily have access to substantially large portions of the 
entire procurement market, such as national defense-related products and 
services, the set asides for the small and minority-owned businesses, and 
the procurement of products or services below the $100,000 threshold.  It 
should also be noted that the U.S. regulatory restrictions and barriers 
appear to be the same as before the KORUS FTA was executed, with the 
exception of the prohibition on required prior work experience in a U.S. 
territory during the awarding process.  Nevertheless, it is certain that, as 
discussed earlier, Korean firms will have greater opportunities than other 
countries for entry into the U.S. procurement market because there are a 
number of contract actions with large dollar values that are open to Korean 
 
177 Id. art. 8.3. 
178 See supra Table 8. 
179 This long-term policy is described well on the DAPA’s homepage.  See Introduction, DAPA, 
http://www.dapa.go.kr/mbshome/mbs/dapa_eng/subview.jsp?id=dapa_eng_020100000000 (last visited 
May 9, 2014). 
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firms.  Further, in light of the procurement market’s size and Korean firms’ 
strong interests and efforts when compared to U.S. firms, the KORUS FTA 
will likely bring relatively more benefit to Korean firms once ratified. 
Now, the Korean firms should explore and develop more effective 
ways to penetrate the procurement market because the KORUS FTA itself 
does not guarantee a substantial increase in Korean firms’ market shares. 
Korean private firms should therefore make their own efforts to increase 
their market shares.  The three ways to accomplish this, as previously 
discussed, include concentrating on the MAS Program, subcontracting 
opportunities with the U.S. prime contractors, and strategic alliance with 
small and minority-owned businesses. 
The Korean government should also make an effort to support Korean 
firms’ activities.  Chapter 17 requires the establishment of a working group 
at a government level to foster the procurement process.  The working 
group is expected to spot and eliminate certain types of administrative or 
legal barriers, if any, to the other party’s suppliers.  If the working group 
operates well, it may contribute to the further expansion of the procurement 
market to Korean firms. 
Doing business with the U.S. federal government may require a lot of 
time, energy, and cost compared with direct negotiation and sale in the 
commercial world.  The government contractors must patiently wade 
through the government procurement process that makes the sale more 
complex and longer to complete.  However, if private firms learn the 
system and are patient and persistent, they can make good—even big—
money doing business with the U.S. federal government. 
Although the size of the Korean procurement market is roughly six 
times smaller than that of the United States, U.S. firms will still have many 
opportunities in the Korean market once the KORUS FTA is ratified.  As 
compared with Korean firms’ strong interests and effort, however, it 
appears that few U.S. firms are interested in the Korean market.  Further, 
most of the commodities made in the United States are not as price 
competitive compared with Korean commodities in the procurement 
market.  Thus, interested U.S. firms should focus on service sectors that are 
competitive and not dealt with by Korean firms.  However, U.S. firms 
should also be aware of existing language and cultural barriers when 
entering into the Korean market.  To overcome these barriers, the formation 
of strategic alliances with appropriate Korean firms may be the best way to 
explore and develop. 
 
